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THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ON THE CHOICE 
BETWEEN EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN FAMILY 
ENTERPRISES 
Abstract 
Ambidexterity, the ability of firm to balance the need to explore for new and novel and 
exploit its existing knowledge, skills and capabilities has become an important issue for 
firms in these volatile times. What‘s been missing from this discussion is consideration of 
how the unique character of family enterprises influences their investments in exploration 
or exploitation? In this paper we develop a theoretical model to explain how the 
governance and ownership characteristics of a family enterprise impact the family 
enterprise‘s investments in exploration and exploitation activities. We contribute to the 
literature on family enterprises by proposing that certain governance characteristics such 
as the tenure of the generation in control, the proportion of senior management positions 
controlled by the family, the dispersion of family ownership and the transfer of control to 
the younger generation will all have certain effects on the investments in exploratory 
activities. Building on the relational view of family enterprises, we suggest that the 
characteristics of their relations with their employees and outside partners will influence 
the level of investments in exploratory and exploitative activities. Our theoretical 
standpoint within the context of organizational adaptation also shows that the two 
seemingly contradictory theories of stewardship and agency can be reconciled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Family enterprises, organizational adaptation, exploration and exploitation, 
ambidexterity  
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Introduction 
In a changing environment firms are constantly challenged to achieve the proper 
balance between the two concurrent and potentially competing tasks of alignment and 
adaptation (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004).  The organizational learning literature and the 
recent literature on ambidexterity argues that in a dynamic environment, successful firms 
are required to enhance the value of their existing capabilities and technologies through 
exploitation, while at the same time developing valuable new capabilities through 
exploration (Levinthal & March 1993; March, 1991). That is, an ambidextrous firm is the 
one which, is capable of both exploiting existing competencies as well as exploring new 
opportunities (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009; pp.1). Nokia Corporation for example, in 
the 1990s turned its losses into profits by constantly exploring for new capabilities while 
simultaneously exploiting its traditional capabilities in wood, paper, materials and 
consumer products (Masalin, 2003). 
The need for an organization to pursue these two very different processes 
simultaneously has led to the rapid expansion of the literature on exploration/exploitation, 
more recently renamed ambidexterity and the acknowledgement by many organizational 
scholars of the centrality of this issue to the modern organization. What is currently 
missing from the discussion of exploration/exploitation is consideration of how family 
ownership and control and the characteristics of that ownership, or ―familiness‖, 
influences family firms‘ investments in exploration or exploitation.   
Organizational adaptation was conceptualized in terms of exploration and 
exploitation in March‘s seminal work (1991). Exploration is associated with search, 
experimentation, risk taking, innovation and novelty, while exploitation is associated 
with refinement, selection, production, and recombination of existing knowledge and 
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capabilities (March, 1991; Dittrich & Duysters, 2007). In other words, exploration creates 
variety in experience through search and discovery, while exploitation improves the value 
derived from existing knowledge through routinization, refinement, production, 
implementation and recombination (Holmqvist, 2004). Organizations innovate, in 
general, by combining existing and new knowledge to create novel offerings (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Therefore innovation depends on the flow of new knowledge into the 
firm. Firms hoping to innovate must frequently turn to external sources to gain new ideas, 
insights and expertise. This ability to acquire this knowledge from external entities is 
however limited by an organization‘s own experience and expertise which bounds a 
firm‘s search (Nelson & Winter, 1982). This leads to bounded or patterned search, the 
reliance on established routines and in turn decreasing novelty in the knowledge base of 
the firm and increasing bias in its investments towards exploitation of its existing 
knowledge base.  
Exploration and exploitation emerge from firms‘ contradictory knowledge 
processing capabilities (Floyd & Lane, 2000) and compete for the scarce resources of the 
firm. Engaging exploration requires different sets of capabilities than those necessary for 
exploitation and firms‘ ability to identify and build these capabilities within its 
boundaries is a source of competitive advantage. However, research has shown that 
exploration and exploitation can be independent and firms can indeed pursue high levels 
of the two concurrently (Beckman, 2006; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Lubatkin, Simsek, 
Ling, & Veiga, 2006). Therefore, in conceptual discussions of ambidexterity, we follow 
Cao et al. (2009) and focus on the balanced dimension of ambidexterity. In doing so we 
concur that a closer match in the relative magnitude of exploratory and exploitative 
activities contributes more to firm performance.  
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In exploring these capabilities as a source of competitive advantages however, a 
large body of the management literature has focused almost solely on large publicly-
owned businesses or technology ventures. While a growing number of research articles 
have begun to recognize the importance of studies on family firms (Chrisman, Chua, & 
Sharma, 2005), to the authors‘ knowledge, the issue of organizational adaptation, 
specifically exploration and exploitation, has not been addressed within the context of 
family firms.  
Research on family firms has gained momentum in the last several years (e.g. 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (May 2005, special issue, vol. 29, no. 3); Journal 
of Business Venturing (September 2003, special issue, vol. 18, no. 5). This is especially 
understandable, because the research has shown that the family firms represent a 
substantial portion of the U.S. economy (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996) and are the most 
common form of corporate ownership in the U.S. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999). Building on prior work, in this paper we define family firms as firms 
where there is both significant family ownership and family presence in management 
(Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Kelly, Athanassiou, & Crittenden, 2000). This type 
of ownership and management make the firms unique in the sense that it gives us a 
context where family and business lives intertwine (Chrisman et al., 2005). In the family 
firms literature, the involvement of family in the ownership and management and the 
resulting bundle of resources is referred as ―familiness‖ (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) 
and has been shown to motivate several salient and unique strategic behaviors 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).  
Like other forms of firms, family firms are also impacted by changes in their 
business environment. In times of environmental change enhancing firms‘ existing 
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capabilities and technologies through exploitation ensures their current viability, while 
experimentation and flexibility through exploration insure their future viability (Levinthal 
& March 1993). Since ―familiness‖ motivates the family firms to engage in unique 
strategic behaviors (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), we argue that 
the opportunities and constraints brought about by family firms‘ unique context can affect 
their strategic choices regarding investments in exploration and exploitation. Specifically, 
we ask  how family ownership and family involvement in management (or familiness), 
specifically the characteristics of the familiness, affect the family firms‘ investments in 
explorative and exploitative activities?  
In addressing this question we explore the conditions that are unique to family firms 
and develop a theoretical model of how these characteristics will impact the firm‘s 
investment in exploration and exploitation activities. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) 
suggest that, family firms invest for the long-term (pp.732). In other words, familiness 
focuses resources investment decisions in the firm on optimizing, long-term value. Such a 
long-term approach to management (also see Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003), should correlate with more investments in explorative activities such as 
investments in research and development, new ideas, markets or relations since they have 
less immediate and certain outcomes and require longer time horizons (March, 1991). 
Similarly Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt and Webb (2008) show that in the presence of a threat of 
imitation family firms respond more positively by investing in research and development 
activities demonstrating family firms‘ preference for long-term initiatives. However, 
when we take into account the very nature of such long-term oriented investments, Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) argue that these investments take the form of activities 
that are directed towards capability creation and the refinement of central competencies. 
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From this standpoint, family firms should devote more resources and investments to 
exploitation since improvements in competence at existing procedures make 
experimentation with others (i.e. exploration) less attractive (Levitt & March, 1988). 
Moreover, due to the concentration of the family‘s wealth in a single firm and their 
limited ability to diversify their wealth without diluting their control of their firm, there is 
greater risk-aversion in family firms (La Porta et al., 1999) which will result in 
investments that are more certain, less ambiguous, more predictable with a shorter time to 
payback. In other words, family control may bias firm towards investment in the 
exploitation of existing resources rather then exploration for new resources and 
capabilities.   
What the preceding arguments make clear is that  family firms are unlikely to be 
uniquely biased for or against one form of organizational adaptation, but rather that a 
family firm‘s bias for or against exploration or exploitation is likely to be determined by 
the characteristics of the family ownership, but which characteristics? While there may 
be many characteristics of a particular firm that influence the decisions surrounding 
exploration and exploitation, it is governance which provides family firms their distinct 
character. Governance has been shown to have a significant impact on the way managers 
develop internal routines, processes and systems (Lazonick & O‘Sullivan, 2002) which 
are very likely to influence the choice between exploration and exploitation. Also, 
governance impacts the way firms deal with external entities such as their suppliers and 
customers (Williamson, 1985). Accordingly,  we believe that it is mainly the 
characteristics of these businesses governance structure that will influence their biases in 
regards to exploration and exploitation activities. Therefore, the focus of this article will 
be the governance characteristics of family firms that foster the firms‘ investment in 
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exploration. 
Theory Development and Propositions 
It is established in the family enterprises‘ literature that family enterprises have 
unique governance characteristics that distinguish them from non-family firms. However, 
some of these characteristics may bias them to disproportionately invest in either 
exploratory or exploitative activities. This might lead to deteriorating firm performance 
since, organizations need to be aligned to both exploration and exploitation to achieve 
superior performance (March, 1991; Tushman & O‘Reilly, 1996; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
In the following pages we will develop a model, including propositions, regarding 
specific characteristics of the governance structures of family firm (e.g. tenure of the lead 
family member) that will influence the family firms‘ investments in  exploratory or 
exploitative activities.  
The Role of Family Control 
CEO tenure: 
It is well documented that family business CEOs tend to have a substantially longer 
tenure than CEO‘s of public companies (Lansberg, 1999; Ward, 2004). Le Breton- Miller 
and Miller (2006) suggest that long CEO tenure in family businesses is very much linked 
to sustained pursuit of a particular strategy. While sustained strategic direction is 
generally a desirable characteristic, it biases the firm towards investments directly in 
maintaining the status quo or closely related to the status quo. The anticipation of lengthy 
tenures also drives some leaders to take a farsighted, steward like perspective of the 
business. It is also acknowledge that long tenures of family member CEOs may give 
them more discretion over the choice between investing in exploration or exploitation 
activities.  It has also been shown that long tenure makes CEO‘s reluctant to engage in 
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risky expedients such as unrelated diversifications, hazardous acquisitions, or 
shortsighted downsizing, which drain resources and may haunt them later in their tenures 
(Amihud & Lev, 1999; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). Musteen, Barker and Baeten 
(2006) also show that there is a central tendency of CEOs to become more conservative 
as their tenure increases. Other habits that may be born of protracted tenures are 
conservative financial leverage, careful cash management, and assiduous preservation of 
resources (Dreux, 1990).  Research indicates that over time family firms have a tendency 
to become more conservative and less willing to take the risks associated with 
entrepreneurial activities. Zahra (2005) for example, found that one of the main indicators 
of decreasing  entrepreneurial activities is the long tenure of CEO founders. Similarly, 
Richard, Wu and Chadwick (2009) in their recent study, found that CEO tenure 
negatively moderates the entrepreneurial orientation and performance relationship. Prior 
work has argued that bias towards conservatism and risk aversion over CEO tenure 
occurs because of the high risk of failure among entrepreneurial ventures (Morris, 1998), 
as well as the risk of destruction of family wealth (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997). 
We concur with this reasoning. All of these findings argue for a bias towards investment 
in exploitative projects which are ‗are positive, proximate, and predictable‘ and away 
from investment in exploratory projects which are  characterized by high variance and 
having returns that ‗are uncertain, distant and often negative‘ (March, 1991). Hence we 
propose that lengthy tenures of the generation in control of the family enterprise will 
make investments in explorative activities less attractive.  
Proposition 1: As The tenure of the family CEO in control of the family firm 
lengthens the firm will decrease its investment in explorative activities.  
 
 
The role of senior management: 
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In terms of governance, family firms are also characterized by managerial positions 
occupied by close kinship ties and familial management transfers (Cabrera-Suarez, De 
Saa-Perez, & Garcia-Almeida, 2001; Miller, Steier, & Le Breton-Miller, 2003). Gomez-
Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, and Gutierrez (2001) show that family firms have higher levels of 
managerial entrenchment due to the reduced effectiveness of monitoring managers. 
Consequently, they are more likely to preserve their wealth through political lobbying 
(Morck, Strangeland, & Yeung, 1998) rather than funding innovative ventures. Research 
on family enterprises based on agency literature suggests that such a family control when 
combined with altruism and managerial entrenchment (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001) can prevent investment in the development 
of new capabilities (Chrisman et al., 2005). Research suggests that increased levels of 
management entrenchment lead them to make decisions that are bias towards enhancing 
personal wealth rather then re-investing to the firm (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck et 
al., 1998). Chandler (1990) also views family firms as being overly concerned with 
wealth preservation and ill-equipped to develop organizational capabilities that are 
suitable for technologically advanced industries.   
The entrenchment of family members in senior leadership positions also deters 
exploration because it limits the variation in information access and the potential for 
novel combinations. The advantages of family leadership, shared norms, values, and 
common experiences, also inherently limit the potential for novel combinations of 
information available to the management team, since much of the knowledge, viewpoint, 
thought processes and norms are shared by the family members of the leadership team. 
The lack of novelty limits the investment opportunities in exploration and the potential 
returns to innovation, which will in turn bias investment towards exploitation and away 
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from exploration.  
 Over time the entrenchment of family members in the senior management positions 
may lead to groupthink (Nordqvist, 2005). Groupthink refers to "a mode of thinking that 
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members' striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action" (Janis, 1982, p. 9).Groupthink by its vey nature leads to the 
rejection of novel ideas and the failure of the family enterprise to incorporate outside 
perspectives. So as the entrenchment of the family in the senior leadership persists over 
time the impact of this entrenchment on the investment decisions of the family business 
will increase, which will lead to greater bias towards investment in exploitation and away 
from investment in exploration. This pattern can be mitigated with a change in the senior 
management. As new blood enters the team the patterns that lead to groupthink will be 
disrupted, decreasing managerial entrenchment, increasing the potential novelty of 
information available to the family enterprise, which in turn opens up new opportunities 
for investment in exploratory activities.  A classic example is the entry of the Maytag 
family in to the blue cheese business within a year of a new generation coming to the 
helm of the family enterprise (Maytag Diary Farms, 2009).  This leads to the following 
propositions: 
 
Proposition 1a: As the proportion of senior management positions controlled by the 
family increases the firm will decrease  investments in explorative activities.  
 
Proposition 1b: There will be an interaction between the proportion of senior 
management positions controlled by the family and the tenure of the family 
members in control of the enterprise such that the negative impact on exploratory 
activities will increase as both the average tenure of the family members increase 
and the proportion of senior management positions controlled by the family 
increases. 
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The role of younger generation:  
 Family firms by definition are concerned with the sustainability of the business 
across generations with the older generation of leadership seeing themselves as stewards 
of the family enterprise (Chua et al., 1999). The literature also suggests that for family 
firms to perform well members of younger generation must be integrated into the family 
business (Stavrou, 1999). While existing generations who lead the family  
enterprise are often reluctant to let younger generations join in the decision making of the 
business they do look for opportunities for the younger generation to prove themselves 
(Stavrou, 1999) and investment in new products, services and markets, exploratory 
activities, present just such an opportunity. The entry of a younger generation also brings 
new knowledge, information, values, ways of thinking and ideas into the family 
enterprise which increases the potential for valuable and novel new combinations of the 
information and skills available to the family enterprise. Enhancing the potential return to 
investment in exploratory activity as the younger generation enters the family enterprise. 
In addition, given the potential indulgence of the younger generation due to altruism 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003) the older generation of leaders will be biased towards 
investing in these new ideas in hopes that the younger generation will succeed and to 
placate the younger generation in hopes of avoiding intergenerational conflict. Prior 
research supports this contention, showing that the involvement of the younger 
generations of the family firm enhances entrepreneurial activities such as innovation and 
new venture creation (Salvato, 2004). Accordingly we suggest that:  
Proposition 1c: The entry of the younger generation into the management of the 
family firm will lead to higher levels of investment in explorative activities. 
 
 
Dispersion of family ownership: 
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The structure of the ownership of the family‘s ownership of the enterprise also creates 
unique incentives that may bias the enterprise towards or away form investments in 
exploration or exploitation. Two characteristics of the family‘s ownership are of 
particular interest the dispersion of the ownership among family members and the 
proportion of the family owners directly employed by the enterprise. Recent research has 
established that the declining performance of some family-run groups over time is in part 
due to infighting among rival family members for group resources as control becomes 
more diluted. Powerful insiders compete against each other in a race to the bottom to 
extract resources out of the firm before other family members (Bertrand, et. al., 2008). 
Schulze, et. al. (2003) find that ―dispersion of ownership can give outside shareholders at 
private family firms the incentive to favor consumption‖. These two findings make a 
powerful case that as family ownership is dispersed the time horizon for investment will 
shorten, demands for the extraction of resources will increase and the family enterprise‘s 
investment in the projects that can be characterized as high variance and having returns 
that ‗are uncertain, distant and often negative‘, exploratory projects, will decrease. 
Moreover, it is suggested that dispersion of ownership, which generally comes with 
passing control to later generations, may weaken the entrepreneurial spirit and increase 
the willingness to divest resources rather than investing in projects that are exploratory in 
nature. With the dispersion of ownership of the family firm, it becomes harder to 
maintain control over the family business. This might intensify the potential endowment 
effects and the willingness to undertake riskier investments might decrease (Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 2000). 
Proposition 1d: The dispersion of the ownership of the family firm will lead to 
lower levels of investment in explorative activities. 
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Dispersion often comes in later generations. Over time, the family firm moves away 
from the first generation and the ownership gets more dispersed (Gersick, Davis, 
Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). Therefore, we suggest that the negative relationship 
between the dispersion of the ownership of the family firm and investments in 
exploratory activities will be moderated by the age of the family firm. As such: 
Proposition 1e: There will be an interaction between the dispersion of the 
ownership of the family firm and the age of the family firm, such that the negative 
impact on exploratory activities will increase as both the dispersion of the 
ownership of the family firm increase and the firm age increases. 
 
Percentage of family members employed: 
We argue that investments toward organizational adaptation (or exploration and 
exploitation) within the context of family firms are important, since the long-term 
survival of organizations may rely on both exploration and exploitation (March 1991). 
Exploration without exploitation can lead to too many underdeveloped ideas and loss of 
distinctive advantages, while exploitation without exploration runs the risk of being 
selected out by environmental changes. Investments in explorative activities show a 
desire by the firm to discover new opportunities and to build new competencies in order 
to adapt to the environment (Koza & Lewin, 1998). Investments in exploitative activities, 
on the other hand, are built on firms‘ aim to leverage existing capabilities; the goal is to 
reap economic return from prior exploration activities (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).   
 Further, as investments in explorative and exploitative activities are competing for 
limited resources in a firm, they are more likely to be at two ends of a continuum (March, 
1991; Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006). Some firms, in that regard, are more positioned 
towards investing in exploitative activities, while others tend towards explorative.  
Slack resources, defined as the resource difference between those under a firm‘s 
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control and the minimum amount required for its survival (Cyert & March, 1963; Nohria 
& Gulati, 1996), can be regarded as a sort of resource endowment because slack, or its 
absence, is the cumulative legacy of past performance and reflects the resource stock that 
a firm has accumulated over time (Amason & Mooney, 2002).  
 As one of the important characteristics of family firms, we concur with the 
previous literature that they are characterized with less agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Family involvement increases the alignment, or 
unification (Carney, 2005), between firm ownership and control, thereby reducing 
traditional agency costs and increasing stewardship behavior (Davis et al., 1997). Within 
the context of family firms, we argue that less agency costs might transfer into more slack 
resources available to the family firms, which in turn will induce them to invest more in 
explorative activities for several reasons. First, slack resources act as a facilitator of new 
strategic behavior, since it is the resource that is in excess of the amount required for that 
firm‘s survival. Family firms with slack resource have the ability to look for alternatives 
and experiment with new strategies (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Second, family firms with a 
high level of slack resource also have the motivation to invest in explorative activities. 
Slack resource provides insurance to a firm‘s current viability, allowing it to devote more 
attention to the concerns of future viability. Explorative activities, rather than 
exploitative, addresses this concern as they complement firms‘ need for adaptation. In 
with an increase in slack resources managers become less concerned about the risks of 
failure, since slack resources give them extra resources to buffer the organization from 
losses due to such failures.  
Moreover, contrary to the negative arguments of the effects of altruism on family 
firms (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003), 
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that is the view of altruism which causes free riding, biased perception and indulgence of 
the younger generation, from a stewardship perspective (Davis et al., 1997) we argue that 
this indulgence will lead family firms to allow the younger generation wider latitude to 
pursue and invest in more exploratory activities.  
Therefore from both agency and stewardship perspectives we suggest that:  
Proposition 1f: The proportion of family owners employed in the firm will lead to 
higher levels of investments in explorative activities. 
 
While slack resources offer organizations resources to invest in exploratory 
activities, they might also include the socioemotional wealth. Family firms are generally 
loss averse when it comes to threats to their socioemotional wealth (relinquishing family 
control) even if this means accepting a greater performance hazard (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) also suggest that for family-owned firms, preserving 
the family‘s socioemotional wealth represents a major issue. Moreover, family firms 
literature suggests that as the family ownership and management increase, family‘s 
attachment to the organization also increases (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999, 2003; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Therefore, after a certain threshold, as the proportion 
of family owners employed in the firm increase, it might become more difficult to engage 
in risky expedients such as explorative investments. Thus,  
Proposition 1g: The proportion of family owners employed in the firm will have an 
inverted-U shaped relationship with the levels of investments in explorative 
activities. 
 
The Role of Relationships with Outside Partners 
Sustainability: 
 In addition to having a unique governance structure, family firms also differ from 
 17 
non-family firms in terms of their relationships with their outside partners. For example 
Lyman (1991) shows that managers of family firms use a more personal approach and 
trust their employees more. This in turn contributes to long-term orientation towards their 
employees, clients and outside partners. However, literature has found that, in 
relationships with outside partners, partner turnover will be higher in projects related to 
exploration rather than exploitation (Dittrich & Duysters, 2007). Such changing most of 
the time offer firms the flexibility, innovation and ability to smoothly adjust to changing 
environmental conditions. While long-term orientation in relationships can bring success 
in certain aspects of the business, we suggest that this nature of family firms may retard 
their investments related to organizational exploration.  
Proposition 2: The length of the family’s sustained relationships with employees, 
clients and outside partners will lead to lower levels of investments in explorative 
activities. 
 
Tenure of employees:  
 Miller and Le Breton-Miller‘s (2005) work suggests that family firms particularly 
recognize that employees are important assets for the knowledge base of the company 
and thus should be treated with more consideration. Davis et al. (1997) also argue that 
family owner managers feel more emotional attachment and responsibility for those who 
work for them. While these behaviors benefit the family firms through fewer layoffs and 
lower levels of turnover (Miller & Le-Breton-Miller, 2003; 2005), it also has a price. 
Almeida and Rosenkopf (2003) highlight the importance of employee mobility in 
overcoming search biases and spurring exploration. Longer tenure by employees and 
lower turnover equates to lower levels of new information and knowledge being 
incorporated in to the family enterprise. As noted earlier, the flow of new knowledge and 
information into the firms is an important precursor for the creation of novel 
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recombination requiring exploration. Therefore as the tenure of the family enterprises 
employees increases the firm will surface fewer opportunities for exploration and will 
decrease their investment in exploratory activities.   
Proposition 2a: The average tenure of the employees will lead to lower levels of 
investments in explorative activities. 
 
Long-time clients:  
 Similarly, family firms tend to have long-term associations and enduring 
relationships with their outside stakeholders such as their clients, alliance partners and 
suppliers. Family firms particularly benefit from such long-term relationships by 
sustaining the business in times of trouble and by having superior customer loyalty (Le 
Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006).  Strategic management literature points out that firms 
benefit from relationships from outside stakeholders through knowledge transfer that is 
novel to the firm (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Dyer & Singh, 1998). However, 
intimate, recurrent and trustful relationships, as in the case of enduring relationships of 
family firms, are generally considered to be useful when firms aim at exploitation rather 
than exploration (Krackhardt, 1992). This is because firms need to make the most of 
established technologies and products, and the intense, trustworthy relationships with 
partners in order to exploit knowledge. Exploitation is characterized by routine learning, 
which only adds to the existing knowledge and competencies of a firm without changing 
the nature of its activities (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002). Exploration, on the other hand 
is a non-routinized learning that involves frequent changes and experimentation with new 
alternatives.  
Proposition 2b: The proportion of a family business’s revenues generated from long 
time clients will lead to lower levels of investments in explorative activities. 
 
******************** Insert Figure 1 about here ******************** 
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Summary and Conclusions 
 The competitive nature of today‘s business environment requires that firms adapt to 
changes in the environment. In essence, successful firms are the ones which are not only 
efficient in their management of today‘s business demands but also adaptive to changes 
in the environment (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Therefore, similar to non-family firms, 
family firms should develop the mindset and the organizational mechanisms that will 
allow them to successfully respond to the uncertainty and changes in this competitive 
landscape. However what characteristics of the family enterprise will impact its ability to 
respond? In this paper we have put forth a model that develops the relationship between 
the governance characteristics of a family enterprise and its investment in exploratory and 
exploitative activities.  
  In this article, we focus on two areas of family enterprises that will affect their 
investments in capability creating, exploratory activities. First, both from stewardship and 
agency perspectives, we argue that the governance and ownership characteristics of 
family enterprises will effect their investment in exploratory and exploitative activities. 
Specifically we propose that the tenure of the generation in control, the proportion of 
senior management positions controlled by the family and the dispersion of family 
ownership bias them against investments in exploratory activities. However, our model 
also suggests that bringing the younger generation in to the firm will increase the firm‘s 
investment in exploratory activities and that the transfer of control to the younger 
generation will increase the firm‘s investment in exploration.  We also propose that as the 
proportion of family owners employed by the enterprise increases the firm will increase 
its investment in exploratory activities.  
 Second, we look at the inherent relationship structure of family firms with its 
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employees and outside partners. The outcome of the relation-specific structure gives us a 
unique pattern of family firms with sustainable relationships. While this might seem 
plausible especially when we take into account the long term perspective of most family 
firms (Le Breton Miller & Miller, 2006), it might have detrimental effects to firm 
performance especially when environmental changes require the development of new 
technological capabilities. The lack of turnover and the lengthy tenure of a family 
enterprises employment base decrease the inflow of new knowledge and information into 
the firm, which leads them to discover fewer exploratory opportunities and in turn leads 
to lower investment in exploratory activities. Similarly stability in the family enterprises 
external relations decreases the flow of new information and knowledge into the firm and 
leads to decreased investment in exploratory activities.   
 From a theoretical standpoint and within the context of organizational adaptation, 
our article also shows that when examining investments in exploration and exploitation, 
the two seemingly contradictory theories or stewardship and agency can be reconciled. In 
fact the predictions of both theories regarding the impact of the entry of the younger 
generation into the firm are quite similar – greater investment in exploration. However, at 
the margin the agency argument based on altruism, seems to lead to an expectation that 
this investment would be less beneficial to the firm, since it is based not on reason but 
rather emotion. In contrast stewardship theory seems to argue that this is a rational, 
maximizing behavior that will enhance the performance and survival of the family 
enterprise. This is really an empirical question, which needs to be addressed in future 
research.   
 Future research in this area could begin by testing the propositions put forth in this 
paper, as well as examining the relationship between the levels of investment in 
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exploration and exploitation and family enterprise performance and survival over time. 
The ambidexterity hypothesis and research on exploration and exploitation have become 
an influential research stream in management an important. However to date the research 
has a blind spot – family enterprise, and research on family enterprise also has a clear 
blind spot – research on exploration and exploitation. The importance of this area of 
research is well established, but it is the intersection of those two that we believe 
demands the attention of future research.  
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Figure 1 
Summary of Suggested Propositions 
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